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nothing about the character of the Dela-
ware chapter ofthe Brotherhood since 
it failed to link the beliefs of the Cali-
fornia chapter to the Delaware chapter. 
Id. at 1098. The Court thus concluded 
that the narrow phrasing ofthe stipula-
tion impermissibly invited the jury to 
infer that the abstract beliefs of the 
Delaware chapter were identical to those 
of the California chapter. Id. 
The Court assumed for the sake of 
argument that the beliefs of the Dela-
ware chapter were shown to be racist, 
concluded that evidence of Dawson's 
membership in the Brotherhood was 
nevertheless irrelevant because both 
Dawson and his victim were of the 
same race. Id. The Court distin-
guished Dawson from other cases 
where it had held membership in an 
organization to be relevant for sentenc-
ing purposes. In those cases, the mem-
bership was in some way related to the 
underlying crime of conviction and 
probative of the defendant's bias or 
indicative of his propensity for future 
violence. Id. (citingBarciayv. Florida, 
463 U.S. 939 (1983)) For example, in 
Barclay, the defendant's membership 
in the Black Liberation Army was rel-
evant in a sentencing proceeding be-
cause the underlying conviction was 
for the murder of a white hitchhiker. 
Similarly, in United States v. Abel, 469 
U.S. 45 (1984), the evidence of the 
defendant's and a defense witness' 
membership in the Aryan Brotherhood 
was relevant because the members 
were sworn to lie on behalf of each 
other. 
Unlike these cases cited by the 
Court, the stipulation as to Dawson's 
membership in the Delaware chapter 
of the Brotherhood was not related to 
the underlying conviction and did not 
establish that the Brotherhood had a 
propensity for violent acts. Therefore, 
Dawson's membership in the Brother-
hood was not relevant to the sentenc-
ing proceeding. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 
1098. 
Finally, the Court rejected the state's 
assertion that the stipulation was rel-
evant to prove any aggravating cir-
cumstance. Id. The Court recognized 
that in certain instances membership in 
an organization, such as one that en-
dorses racial killing, may be relevant 
to the jury's inquiry as to whether a 
defendant would be likely to commit 
futureviolentacts. However, the Court 
reasoned that the inference which the 
jury was invited to draw from the stipu-
lation proved nothing more than the 
abstract beliefs of the Delaware chap-
ter of the Brotherhood. The Court 
concluded that with nothing more than 
an abstract showing of Dawson's be-
liefs, the admission of the stipulation 
violated Dawson's First Amendment 
rights. Id. 
In Dawson v. Delaware, the United 
States Supreme Court refined the test 
for determining the admissibility of 
evidence of organizational associations 
and beliefs in a sentencing proceeding. 
Evidence ofa defendant's associations 
or abstract beliefs must be relevant to 
the issues being decided or related to 
the underlying conviction in order to 
protect a defendant's First Amendment 
rights. This decision illustrates the 
Court's fear that the defendant may be 
unfairly prejudiced by the admission 
of such evidence. 
- David E. Canter 
White v. Illinois: SPONTANEOUS 
DECLARATION AND MEDICAL 
EXAMINATION HEARSAY EX-





In White v. IllinOis, 112 S. Ct. 736 
(1992), the United States Supreme 
Court held that the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment ofthe 
U.S. Constitution does not require a 
declarant to testify at trial or be found 
unavailable by the trial court where the 
declarant's testimony can be admitted 
under an established hearsay excep-
tion. Because the declarant's out-of-
court statements carried substantial pro-
bative value that could not be dupli-
cated by mere courtroom repetition, 
the Court reasoned that the Confronta-
tion Clause did not require proof of 
unavailability before the statements 
were permitted under exceptions to the 
hearsay doctrine. 
Petitioner, Randall D. White, was 
charged with the sexual assault ofS. G~, 
a four year old girl. Trial testimony 
established that on April 16, 1988, 
S.G.'s babysitter, Tony DeVore, was 
awakened by screams coming from 
S.G.'s room. Upon nearing S.G.'s 
bedroom, DeVore witnessed White 
leaving the room. DeVore identified 
White as a friend ofthe child's mother, 
Tammy Grigsby. According to 
DeVore's trial testimony, S.G. stated 
that White had put his hand over her 
mouth, choked her, threatened to whip 
her if she screamed, and had "touch[ ed] 
her in the wrong places" (indicating 
the vaginal area). 
S.G. 's mother found her daughter 
"scared" and a "little hyper" when she 
returned home about thirty minutes 
after DeVore had first been awakened. 
S. G. repeated her claims to her mother, 
which led Grigsby to call the police. 
Officer Terry Lewis questioned S.G. 
alone upon arrival at the Grigsby resi-
dence a few minutes later. Lewis' 
summary of S. G. 's statements at trial 
indicated that, again, the child had 
given the same account oftheevening's 
events. The hospital personnel who 
examinedS.G. that night, nurse Cheryl 
Reents and Dr. Michael Meinzen, heard 
essentially the identical story S.O. told 
DeVore, Grigsby, and Lewis. 
S.O. did not testify at petitioner's 
trial, due to emotional difficulty upon 
entering the courtroom. DeVore, 
Grigsby, Lewis, Reents, and Meinzen 
testified at trial, all relating the account 
ofthe incident as told to them by S.G. 
Petitioner objected on hearsay grounds 
to the testimony of these witnesses, 
regarding S.G. 's statements to them. 
The trial court overruled each objec-
tion on the basis of relevant hearsay 
exceptions. Testimony given by 
DeVore, Grigsby, and Lewis was ad-
mitted under the spontaneous declara-
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tion exception, and that of Reents and 
Meinzen was received under the ex-
ception for statements made in the 
course of securing medical treatment. 
Petitioner's motion for mistrial based 
on S.O. 's "presence [and] failure to 
testify" was also denied by the trial 
court. 
The jury found petitioner guilty of 
aggravated criminal sexual assault, resi-
dential burglary, and unlawful restraint. 
The Appellate Court of Illinois af-
firmed the conviction, holding that the 
trial court had properly exercised its 
discretion in ruling that the statements 
offered by the aforementioned wit-
nesses qualified for the relevant excep-
tions to the hearsay doctrine. 
The Illinois Supreme Court denied 
certiorari to petitioner. The Supreme 
Court, however, granted certiorari to 
address the limited issue of whether 
permitting such testimony violated 
petitioner's Sixth Amendment Con-
frontation Clause right. 
The Court found that S.O. 's state-
ments, as repeated by various witnesses, 
were reliable, carrying substantial pro-
bative value adequate to qualify as 
well-established exceptions to the hear-
say doctrine. White v. Illinois, 112 S. 
Ct. 736, 743 (1992). This, the Court 
reasoned, satisfied Sixth Amendment 
concerns of confrontation, which do 
not require that the declarant either be 
present at trial or be found unavailable 
before hearsay testimony may be ad-
mitted. [d. at 741. The Court found 
unavailability analysis necessary only 
where the out-of-court statements at 
issue were made at a prior judicial 
proceeding. [d. 
Petitioner's primary contention was 
that Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 
(1980), demanded his conviction be 
vacated, under the theory that the pros-
ecution must either produce the 
declarant at trial or prove the declarant 
to be unavailable prior to the intro-
duction of hearsay testimony. The 
court rejected the argument. White, 
112 S. Ct. at 741. In Roberts, the Court 
considered a Confrontation Clause 
challenge involving the introduction at 
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trial oftestimony from a previous prob-
able-cause hearing, where the witness 
was not present at the trial, but was 
subject to cross examination at the 
hearing. [d. While implying that the 
Sixth Amendment generally requires 
that a declarant either be produced at 
trial or found unavailable before hear-
say testimony may be received, the 
Court in Roberts nonetheless rejected 
the Confrontation Clause argument. 
[d. 
In the case at bar, however, the 
Court reasoned that Roberts's expan-
sive reading of the Confrontation 
Clause was negated by the subsequent 
decision of United States v. [nadi, 475 
U.S. 387 (1986). White, 112 S. Ct. at 
741. In light of [nadi, where the Court 
considered the admission of hearsay 
statements made by a co-conspirator in 
the course ofthe conspiracy, the Court 
read Roberts to represent the "proposi-
tion that unavailability analysis is a 
necessary part of the Confrontation 
Clause inquiry only when the chal-
lenged out-of-court statements were 
made in the course of a prior judicial 
proceeding." [d. (emphasis added). 
The statements made by S.O. in the 
case at bar were distinguished by the 
Court from those made in Roberts, 
where the statements sought to be in-
troduced were made at a prior court 
proceeding, and thus, lost no 
"evidentiary value if the out-of-court 
statements were replaced with live tes-
timony." [d. at 743. S.O. 's statements 
made under the stress of a startling 
event and in the course of procuring 
medical treatment, however, carried 
unique and valuable guarantees ofcred-
ibility that the jury may not perceive if 
repeated by the declarant in the anti-
septic environment of a courtroom. [d. 
''The preference for live testimony ... 
is because of the importance of cross 
examination. . .. But where [the] 
proffered hearsay has sufficient guar-
antees of reliability to come within a 
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay 
rule, the Confrontation Clause is satis-
fied." [d. 
The Court also rejected the adop-
tion of an "unavailability rule," which 
would require that a declarant either be 
present at trial or be found unavailable 
prior to the introduction of hearsay 
testimony. [d. at 742. The Court stated 
that implementation of such a rule 
would prove to be neither an absolute 
bar to out-of-court statements, nor aid 
in the fact-finding process. [d. Such 
a rule, the Court noted, would merely 
prove an additional burden on litigants 
without offering any additional protec-
tion to an accused's Sixth Amendment 
right to face his accuser. [d. The rule 
would make it necessary to repeatedly 
locate and keep available each 
declarant, even ifneitherparty intended 
to call such witnesses to the stand. 
The Court concluded that an 
individual's Sixth Amendment Con-
frontation Clause right is not violated 
by the introduction of hearsay testi-
mony under the spontaneous declara-
tion and medical examination excep-
tions, irrespective of the declarant's 
availability. Under the Court's reason-
ing, the nature ofthese exceptions de-
mands that such utterances not be re-
peated by the declarant in the clinical 
atmosphere of the courtroom, as they 
would lose their situational sincerity 
and value. 
The Court thus continued a trend of 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause interpretation where only pro-
bative evidence, which is based on a 
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception, or 
otherwise carries particular guarantees 
of credibility, is admissible. In so 
doing, the Court opened the door to 
further litigation over the reliability of 
such out-of-court statements, as each 
state may observe and give credence to 
hearsay exceptions not unanimously 
accepted. The amendment was origi-
nally ratified to prevent the abuses of 
prosecution by ex parte affidavits in 
sixteenth century England. Therefore, 
interpreting the Confrontation Clause 
to regulate the admission of hearsay 
may unnecessarily strain the actual lan-
guage and original intent of the fram-
ers of the Sixth Amendment's Con-
frontation Clause. 
- Paula Elbich 
Hilton v. South Carolina Public. Rail-
way Commission: FEDERAL STAT-
UTE IMPOSING LIABILITY ON 
ST ATE-OWNED RAILROADS 
FOR DAMAGES TO INJURED 
EMPLOYEES ENFORCEABLE IN 
STATE COURTS ONLY. 
In Hilton v. South Carolina Public 
Railways Commission, 112 S. Ct. 560 
(1991), the United States Supreme 
Court held that the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act continued to authorize 
suits for damages against state-owned 
railroads and was enforceable in state 
courts, but not in federal courts. In 
reaching its decision, the Court deter-
mined that a federally-based action 
brought in state court did not abrogate 
a State's immunity from suit under the 
Eleventh Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, because that 
amendment has been held not to apply 
to state courts. The Court's ruling 
ensured that state-employed railroad 
workers would have a forum in which 
to redress work-related injuries. 
The South Carolina Public Rail-
ways Commission, an agency of the 
State of South Carolina, was a com-
mon carrier engaged in interstate com-
merce by railroad. Kenneth Hilton, a 
railroad worker, claimed to have been 
injured while on the job due to the 
negligence ofthe Commission. Under 
South Carolina law, railroad workers 
were excluded from coverage under 
the workers' compensation statute. 
Thus, in order to recover for his inju-
ries, Hilton sued the Commission un-
derthe remedial provisions ofthe Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act (FELA) 
in a federal court. 
While Hilton's case was pending, 
the Supreme Court decided the case of 
Welch v. Texas Department of High-
ways and Public Transportation, 483 
U.S. 468 (1987), holding that a federal 
statute which incorporated the reme-
dial provisions of FE LA, did not allow 
a cause of action to be maintained 
against a state agency in a federal court. 
In light of this decision, Hilton dis-
missed his suit in federal court and 
refiled in a South Carolina state court. 
The state trial court dismissed Hilton's 
claim, basing its decision upon a read-
ing of Welch, together with the subse-
quent Supreme Court decision of Will 
v. Michigan Department of State Po-
lice, 491 U.S. 58(1989). Thetrialcourt 
interpreted these cases as precluding a 
FELA suit for damages against a state 
agency, even if maintained in a state 
forum. Hilton appealed and the state 
supreme court aff"rrmed the lower court's 
decision. 
Reversing the state courts' decisions, 
the United States Supreme Court drew 
a sharp distinction between a FELA 
based action maintained in a federal 
court and one in a state court. The Court 
recognized that a FELA action brought 
in federal court implicated the States' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
suit. Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. 
Comm 'n, 112 S. ct. 560, 563 (1991). 
Applying an Eleventh Amendment 
analysis, the Court found that FELA 
did not contain a clear expression of 
congressional intent to abrogate the 
States' Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity, and therefore, FELAactions could 
not be maintained in a federal court. [d. 
(citing Welch, 483 U.S. at 474-76). 
Because the Eleventh Amendment 
has been held not to apply to state 
courts, the Court determined that a 
FELA action brought in a state court 
did not implicate any constitutional 
rule of law. [d. at 565. Thus, Hilton 
presented a case of pure statutory con-
struction, which left the Court to decide 
the issue of whether Congress, in enact-
ing FELA, intended to create a cause of 
action against the States to be enforced 
in a state court. [d. 
The Court re-examined its first in-
terpretation of FE LA in Parden v. Ter-
minal Railway of Alabama Docks De-
partment, 377 U.S. 184 (1964). The 
Court noted that in Parden the terms of 
FELA were construed to mean that 
when Congress used the phrase "[ e ] very 
common carrier by railroad" to describe 
the class of employers subject to 
FELA's terms, it intended to include 
state-owned railroads. Hilton, 112 S. 
Ct. at 563 (citing Parden, 377 U.S. at 
187-88). The Court then reaffirmed 
that interpretation, holding that FELA 
continued to authorize suits for dam-
ages against state-owned railroads. [d 
The Court concluded, however, that 
the second part of its decision in 
Parden, which held that by entering 
the business of operating a railroad a 
State waived its Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from suit in a federal court, 
had been overturned by its subsequent 
decision in Welch. [d. at 563. Thus, 
the Court narrowed the issue presented 
to whether FELA based actions could 
be enforced in a state court. 
The Commission contended that 
this issue was controlled by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Will v. 
Michigan Department of State Police, 
491 U.S. 58 (1989). Hilton, 112 S. Ct. 
at 565. In Will, the Court held that a 
State is not a ''person'' suable under a 
federal statute which lacked any "clear 
statement" of congressional intent to 
impose liability. [d. at 563 (citing Will, 
491 U.S. at 58). The Commission 
argued that the "clear statement" rule 
should be read in context with the 
Court's decision in Welch, that FELA 
did not contain a clear statement of 
congressional intent, to effectively 
overturn the entire holding of Parden. 
[d. 
The Court disagreed, reasoning that 
the "clear statement" rule should not 
automatically be implemented when a 
case did not involve an issue of consti-
tutional interpretation. [d. at 565-66. 
Instead, the Court categorized the clear 
statement rule as a canon of statutory 
construction in those cases which did 
not implicate the States' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. [d. In resolv-
ing a case of pure statutory construc-
tion, the Court found the doctrine of 
stare decisis most compelling because 
it promoted stability, predictability and 
respect for judicial authority. [d. at 
563-64. In the instant case, the Court 
determined that the policy consider-
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